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Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee has reported out a resolution aimed at replacing the present review operations of Congress over the CIA and other intelligence agencies with a formal Committee on Intelligence Operations.

Congressional oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies of similar purpose—such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and others—would rest with a formal nine-member Commission, composed of three members each of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Appropriations Committees. At the present time, oversight of such operations rests with several Members appointed by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Mr. President, such oversight has rested with the Armed Services Committee since the creation of the CIA. There has been no challenge to the functions of the Armed Services Committee in this regard, and I might say that I know of no reason to suppose that the arrangement is not proving viable and effective, as, indeed, it seems to be.

It is obvious that in sensitive and secret matters of this kind, with human lives involved in some aspects of intelligence operations, there is every reason to confine critical information to as few ears as possible.

While it is perhaps true that decisions made by these agencies do have some ultimate bearing on foreign policy, it is also a fact that almost every bill which comes before Congress has ramifications beyond the scope of the particular committee to which it is referred. There is certainly a great deal of correlation in these matters.

I do not think that the present instance is significantly different. If joint jurisdiction and oversight should be accorded both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, then there is no reason why joint jurisdiction should not be accorded committees on any of the many bills which affect more than one legislative area.

As I understand it, the members of the Armed Services Committee who oversee operations of the CIA and other similar agencies have been quite cooperative in providing information to the Foreign Relations Committee on such subjects as the intelligence estimates for various countries, without divulging aspects of their operations.

The reasoning behind the proposal is, in my opinion, rather tenuous; and the justifications for maintaining the present methods of oversight and supervision are strong. There is much to be said for keeping the apparatus of supervision small and select, and I urge that my colleagues vote accordingly. I intend to vote to support the present, quite workable methods.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROPOSED COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I report to the Senate a resolution creating a Committee on Intelligence Operations approved by the Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 14 to 5 on May 17, 1966. On June 27, I sent to all Members of the Senate a copy of this resolution and report for their information. I did so in anticipation of the subject being taken up under the circumstances as they have developed this morning.

Therefore, I report the resolution to the Senate and ask that the clerk read it for the information of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be stated for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That there is hereby created, effective at the beginning of the Ninetieth Congress, a committee to be known as the Committee on Intelligence Operations to consist of nine Senators, of whom three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations from among the members of that committee, three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services from among the members of that committee, and three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations from among the members of that committee. No more than two of the members appointed from each such standing committee shall be from the same political party. The chairman of the committee shall be elected by the members.

Sec. 2. It shall be the duty of the Committee on Intelligence Operations to keep itself fully and currently informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and other agencies of the Government insofar as the activities of such agencies relate to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. The committee's duties shall include, but not be limited to, review of intelligence and counterintelligence activities and legislative oversight of the coordination of such activities among the various agencies concerned.

Sec. 3. The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, and to take such testimony as it deems advisable.

Sec. 4. A majority of the members of the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that a lesser number, to be fixed by the committee, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of taking sworn testimony.

Sec. 5. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the various departments and agencies of the Government.

Sec. 6. The committee shall take special care to safeguard information affecting the national security.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me without losing the floor?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, notwithstanding rule XXVI, I ask unanimous consent that it now be in order to proceed to the consideration of the resolution just reported, on the investigation

of the CIA, for the limited purpose of determining any procedural problems relating thereto.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the resolution is not to "investigate" the CIA; it is to create a committee. The original McCarthy resolution was to investigate the CIA. This resolution was reported in place of that one.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the change be inserted in the request.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright] is recognized.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to address a few remarks to the substance of, the necessity for, and the justification for the resolution which has just been stated. It is reported in place of the original resolution proposed in January by the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCarthy].

Mr. President, the resolution which I bring before the Senate this morning would authorize the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence Operations. It would consist of a total of nine members, three each from the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations. Its mandate would be "to keep itself fully and currently informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and other agencies of the Government insofar as the activities of such agencies relate to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence."

Our sponsorship of this resolution proceeds from the belief that the CIA plays a major role in the foreign policy decisionmaking process and that by its activities it is capable of exerting—and has exerted—a very substantial influence on our relations with other nations. The resolution which we bring before you is an assertion of the duty of the Foreign Relations Committee to be aware of all the developments and activities of our Government as they relate to foreign affairs.

When the CIA was created, the extent and nature of its present role could not be foreseen. From a modest beginning in an entirely different context of world politics, the operations of the CIA have grown today to exceed the Department of State in both number of personnel and budget. The CIA is an efficient organization and I compliment it because in many countries its representatives stay longer and in many ways are better prepared—certainly they are better financed and, in many cases, have more influence—than our ambassadors.

The CIA has certain unique characteristics which set it apart from other institutions involved in the foreign policy process of the Government. These characteristics give the Agency unusual advantages and influence and suggest the desirability of the Foreign Relations